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Rawls’s Justification 
Model for Ethics: 
What Exactly Does It Justify?
Necip Fikri Alican
Rawls is famous for two things: his attempt to ground morality 
in rationality and his conception of justice as fairness. His work 
has been resounding on both fronts, the first constituting the 
justificatory framework for the second. Yet from the beginning, 
the outcome has been more doctrinaire than the method should 
have allowed with design details promising objectivity. This 
article goes to that beginning, or to a reasonable proxy for it, in 
the “Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics,” with the aim 
of exposing and examining the discrepancy where it originates. 
The goal is not to prey on the earliest version of an initiative 
later undergoing revision but to identify and investigate the in-
ception of a systematic bias that is retained rather than revised 
in subsequent iterations. The primary finding is that justice as 
fairness is too dogmatic an outcome for the decision procedure 
proposed. The corresponding principles (of justice as fairness) 
are consistent with the proposed procedure only relative to a 
specific system already presumed valid. A secondary finding, 
supported by the same considerations as the first, is that the 
decision procedure itself, regardless of whether it works well 
with the particular principles in question, may not be as use-
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ful as it appears, turning out to justify only, or mostly, what is 
widely accepted anyway.
1. Razzle-Dazzle
We all like a good story. And if it is told just right, it does 
not even have to be true. The crystal ball, the deck of cards, 
the coffee grounds—they are all extraneous to the fortune 
told. The divination itself does not come from them. The 
oracle may, as it happens, be right on target, but it is the show 
that promotes persuasion. Without the razzle-dazzle, what the 
diviner has is just another story, true or false, right or wrong, 
good or bad. The purpose of this article is to determine where 
Rawls gets his story, how credible it is, and whether it works.
This is not an assault on Rawls. He tells a good story. But it 
does recall the allegorical introduction above. Essay after es-
say, book after book, everything comes out just right, that is, 
his own moral outlook turns out to be validated by an ethical 
justification model of his own design. There would be noth-
ing strange in this if it were not for Rawls’s assurance that the 
model guarantees objectivity. As it is, given the claim to objec-
tivity, what is suspicious is that an objective approach should 
be so biased toward a particular outcome, or if one prefers, 
toward a particular kind of outcome.
A tempting response is that a good model would naturally 
be biased toward the right answer. Another is that ignoring or 
weeding out wrong answers is not a violation of objectivity. 
There is indeed nothing wrong with giving the same answer 
every time if it is the right answer. But that is precisely what 
is in question.
To restate the problem, this time in more formal terms 
than in the opening allegory, Rawls operates with a decision 
procedure for ethics that keeps corroborating the same moral 
outlook, a liberal one, whereas the objectivity he claims for the 
procedure might reasonably have been expected to be consis-
tent with a wider range of moral, social, or political perspec-
tives, or perhaps with a single position equidistant to polar 
extremes.1 The aim of this article is to ascertain whether this 
1 I am merely acknowledging, as opposed to either praising or protesting, 
the liberalism of Rawls, who openly embraces both the position and the name 
for it. The label “liberal,” much like the label “conservative” with which it is 
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is a real problem and whether it may be overcome to salvage 
the analytic apparatus Rawls recommends for ethical justifica-
tion.
Departure from objectivity is, of course, always a real prob-
lem. And this is the conclusion of this article as well. But its 
focus is more specific. It is concerned with two related ques-
tions. The first is about internal consistency: (1) Does the ethi-
cal justification model developed by Rawls justify the moral 
principles advocated by Rawls? The second is about universal 
relevance: (2) Can the ethical justification model developed by 
Rawls justify any moral principles?
Covering both questions, the overarching reason for sus-
picion, to be confirmed or rejected here, is that certain meth-
odological constraints, conceived as anchors to objectivity 
(freedom from bias) and safeguards against relativism, may 
not just undermine the justification of the particular principles 
presented by Rawls, thus making him dogmatic in endorsing 
them, but also preclude the justification of any moral princi-
ples whatsoever, or at least any useful or substantive ones (the 
kind directly relevant to the adjudication of moral problems). 
In the first case, the orientation toward objectivity and the pre-
cautions against relativism contradict the principles adopted. 
In the second case, they engender sterility: the justification of 
generalizations that are already widely accepted.
This is not, even incidentally, a rejection of the principles 
espoused by Rawls. More accurately, it is not a critique of 
those principles independently of their relation to the jus-
tification model employed to validate them. The principles 
themselves are neither surpassed by alternatives nor in urgent 
need of justification. I myself would gladly defend them on 
that point, that is, from a standalone perspective separated 
from the question of justification by Rawls, but I will not do 
so, not here anyway, as this is an altogether different matter. I 
will, however, question their justification through the decision 
procedure developed and proposed by Rawls.
Let me acknowledge at once that both the model and the 
regularly contrasted in ordinary discourse, can become charged with negative 
connotations and thereby associated with negative intentions. As against 
this, the reference here is strictly in recognition of the liberalism Rawls claims 
for himself: 1985, 245–251; 1987, 1–25, especially 18, including n. 27; 1993, 6, 
156–158, 233; 2001, 104–106, 148–150, 153–157, 189–192.
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output have evolved over time. I do not deny this. What I 
deny is that the evolution has made my concerns irrelevant. 
Granted, ethical justification has always been a work in prog-
ress for Rawls. But my impression is that the problems identi-
fied in this article were never met at any point in that process 
because they were never even on the agenda. This impression 
is not a hunch but an observation, or to be precise, a judgment 
formulated on the basis of a series of observations. While 
negative claims are notoriously difficult to prove, section 5 of 
the present article is a representative effort. The aim there is 
not to establish beyond a doubt that Rawls later says nothing 
that could possibly be interpreted as an improvement upon 
any of the difficulties in his earlier works but to demonstrate 
a relevant methodological continuity between the earlier and 
later works that corroborates the timeless relevance of my 
concerns here.
To be sure, the model’s evolution can be traced through 
various paradigms in succession: the considered moral judg-
ments of competent moral judges; the strategic outlook of 
contractors working out a reflective equilibrium from the 
original position; the various modes of public reason (or pub-
lic justification) converging toward an overlapping consensus 
(grounded in a reasonable moral psychology). The correspond-
ing normative output undergoes development as well, ranging 
from the relatively detailed set of principles presented early on 
to the more elegant and now famous twin principles explicat-
ing Rawls’s conception of justice in social institutions.
Regular recalibration on the part of Rawls requires meticu-
lous attention on the part of the critic. The broader the scope 
of consideration, the better. But that is a project for a book, at 
least one, probably more. A feasible alternative to comprehen-
sive coverage is to work with A Theory of Justice (1971/1999, 
hereafter “Theory”).2 That might be the obvious choice, but 
that work has undergone enough critical scrutiny to save 
generations of scholars the trouble of looking for something 
new in it. Besides, it remains in the middle, drawing on earlier 
material and anticipating later development, but representing 
2 Parenthetical references giving a publication year (and, where relevant, 
page numbers) without naming the author are to Rawls. Quotations omit 
footnote reference markers in the original.
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neither perspective adequately. Fresher insight can be had 
by going back to the beginning, which cannot be too far from 
Rawls’s “Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics” (1951, 
hereafter “Outline”).3
Starting from the beginning should prove enlighten-
ing (section 2) so long as observations and inferences (sec-
tions 3–4) are filtered through an awareness of subsequent 
departures and turning points (section 5). Proceeding on that 
basis, this article examines, first whether Rawls’s decision 
procedure for ethics justifies the moral principles he purports 
to be justified by that model, second whether that procedure 
facilitates the adjudication of actual moral problems (perennial 
or emerging) or remains an exercise in formalism with little or 
no practical import or serviceable implications.
The conclusion regarding the first question is that the vali-
dation connection between the model and the output is not as 
strong, or even as clear, as Rawls would have us believe, and 
that Rawls is, in this respect, inevitably dogmatic in his sup-
port of the principles he advocates. The conclusion regarding 
the second question is that design elements intended to ensure 
objectivity and thus to avoid relativism weaken the credibility 
of the model as a decision procedure relevant to moral reality, 
or to be more specific, as a decision procedure capable of justi-
fying the kind of moral principles that would be useful in the 
adjudication of moral problems.
This, in effect, is to leave Rawls with a vacuous decision 
procedure and dogmatic principles. And that, in turn, may 
seem to underestimate his contributions. But it is not as harsh 
as all that. While there is indeed some tension between this 
criticism and Rawls’s reputation, there is also room enough 
for both. Nothing is ever gained from reacting to mediocrity. 
And no harm can come from exposing a problem in excellence. 
3 While the “Outline” (1951) is indeed Rawls’s first publication, it is also 
common to start with his doctoral dissertation (1950), and sometimes even 
with his undergraduate thesis (1942). This is just as well, since the “Outline” 
originates in his dissertation. As for his senior thesis, that piece was bundled 
together with a short manuscript from Rawls’s maturity and published 
posthumously as a book (2009), with notable philosophers serving as editors 
and commentators, including Habermas with an afterword for the German 
edition (2010). His dissertation has had a steadier audience, but it, too, has 
recently seen something of a revival in readership and commentary. See, for 
example, Mäkinen and Kakkuri-Knuuttila (2013).
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Criticizing Rawls detracts no more from his contributions than 
centuries of criticism have from Plato’s.
2. Immediate Context
Here is the immediate problem motivating Rawls to seek a 
solution later becoming the focus of his life’s work:
Does there exist a reasonable decision procedure which is 
sufficiently strong, at least in some cases, to determine the 
manner in which competing interests should be adjudicated, 
and, in instances of conflict, one interest given preference over 
another; and, further, can the existence of this procedure, as 
well as its reasonableness, be established by rational methods 
of inquiry? [1951, 177]
This particular quotation is from the “Outline” but the 
question itself has been with Rawls throughout his career. He 
approaches the problem in two parts. First (1951, 177–191), in 
the theoretical portion of his outline, he develops a general 
decision procedure for the justification of moral principles. 
Second (1951, 191–197), in the practical portion of his out-
line, he uses that decision procedure to justify a specific set 
of moral principles he introduces as “principles of justice.”4 
With respect to the first part, his decision procedure states that 
moral principles are justified insofar as they explicate moral 
judgments that coincide with the considered moral judgments 
of competent moral judges (1951, 187–189).5 With respect to 
4 These are the seven moral principles in section 5.5 of the “Outline” 
(1951, 192–193). They mark the inception of Rawls’s conception of justice as 
fairness. This is a dynamic conception, evolving throughout his career, but not 
so much that it cannot be identified (wherever it turns up) as essentially the 
same general notion, and characterized as a conception of justice as fairness, 
in any formulation and combination of principles used to express it: 1951, 
192–193; 1957, 653–654; 1958, 165; 1971, 60, 302, cf. 83, 250 (=1999, 53, 266–267, 
cf. 72, 220); 1982, 5, cf. 46–55; 1985, 227; 1993, 291, cf. 331–334; 2001, 42. The 
most prominent turning point in the course of evolution is the transition from 
seven (1951) to two (1957/1958) principles. But that is not the end of the story. 
The twin principles themselves change over time. Note, for example, that 
Rawls identifies (1993, 5, n. 3) the Tanner lectures (1981/1982) as a corrective 
transition between the principles of justice in Theory (1971, 60, 302 [=1999, 53, 
266–267]) and those in later works (1982, 5, 46–55)—a correction largely in 
reaction to criticism from Hart (1973). Nevertheless, this does not rule out the 
continuity of the principles as increasingly more satisfactory attempts (at least 
as far as Rawls is concerned) to investigate the same concept.
5 Rawls explains in detail what he means by “competent moral judge” 
(1951, 178–181), “considered moral judgment” (1951, 181–183), and “explication” 
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the second part, his moral principles explicate a conception 
of justice as fairness in social institutions—or they explicate 
moral judgments that hang together as a conception of justice 
as fairness in social institutions (1951, 192–193).6
This section of the present article is devoted to an assess-
ment of the compatibility between the two parts of Rawls’s 
paper in an effort to determine both whether his decision 
procedure validates his conception of justice and whether it 
is capable of justifying anything at all that might prove nor-
matively useful as part of a comprehensive moral outlook. 
The reason for hesitation, as explained in general terms in 
the preceding section, is that the conception of justice is a lib-
eral one, whereas the decision procedure is one that should, 
given the emphasis on objectivity, yield principles that have a 
more universal appeal.7 Moral principles making up a liberal 
conception of justice are unlikely to be filtered without loss 
(1951, 184–187). These have long been standard terminology in the literature. 
However, apart from these, the summary statement encapsulating the decision 
procedure, the one to which this note refers, is rough in the sense that it 
includes one and omits three of what Rawls cites as jointly sufficient criteria 
for the justification of moral principles. The other three criteria (1951, 187–189) 
are as follows: (1) A moral principle must show a capacity to become accepted 
by competent moral judges after they have freely weighed its merits by 
criticism and open discussion and after each has thought it over and compared 
it with his or her own considered moral judgments. (2) A moral principle must 
be able to function in existing instances of conflicting opinion and in new 
cases causing difficulty. (3) A moral principle must show a capacity to hold 
its own against a subclass of the considered moral judgments of competent 
moral judges. The summary statement still suffices for the fundamental notion 
behind Rawls’s account of the justification of moral principles. The other three 
criteria are best brought out as they become relevant to the discussion.
6 While “justice as fairness” (1957, 1958, 1985, 2001) is not yet standard 
terminology in the “Outline,” the moral principles in that work are, by 
Rawls’s own designation, “principles of justice” (1951, 191). And he is already 
concerned there with “fair decisions on moral issues” (1951, 181) and with a 
“fair opportunity for all concerned” (1951, 182). Hence, even without a formal 
name for them, the seven principles in question are, in fact, principles of justice 
as fairness (cf. n. 4 above).
7 As stated in n. 1 above, the term “liberal” is intended in a descriptive 
sense faithful to the actual liberalism Rawls champions in print. The “Outline” 
predates the explicit advocacy of liberalism present in the references cited 
above (n. 1), but the orientation is the same, implicit at least in the continuity 
between the seven principles in the “Outline” and the twin principles 
formulated later (cf. nn. 4, 6 above). The evidence for this is the conception and 
presentation of “justice as fairness” (and thereby any formulation, early or late, 
of the attendant principles) as “a form of political liberalism” (e.g., 2001, 183).
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through a decision procedure that is as impartial as claimed. 
This specific source of apprehension recalls the more general 
one of whether such filtration would leave us with anything 
worthwhile at all.
Not all competent moral judges across time, nations, and 
cultures can reasonably be expected to have an identical set of 
moral judgments.8 Not even all competent moral judges within 
the same time period, nation, and culture are likely to have an 
identical set of moral judgments. This suggests that a decision 
procedure drawing on the wisdom of a panel of judges needs 
certain safeguards to keep relativism from creeping into the sys-
tem. Rawls’s precaution against relativism consists of universal-
istic clauses built into the decision procedure. Design specifica-
tions call for both considered moral judgments and reasonable 
moral principles that transcend time, place, and person.
Concerning considered moral judgments, Rawls requires, 
among other things,9 a demonstrable relevance and effective-
ness inherent in the judgment as a stability of sorts:
It is required that the judgment be stable, that is, that there 
be evidence that at other times and at other places competent 
judges have rendered the same judgment on similar cases, 
understanding similar cases to be those in which the relevant 
facts and the competing interests are similar. The stability must 
hold, by and large, over the class of competent judges and over 
their judgments at different times. Thus, if on similar cases of 
a certain type, competent judges decided one way one day, 
and another the next, or if a third of them decided one way, 
a third the opposite way, while the remaining third said they 
did not know how to decide the cases, then none of these judg-
ments would be stable judgments, and therefore none would 
be considered judgments. These restrictions are justified on 
the grounds that it seems unreasonable to have any confidence 
that a judgment is correct if competent persons disagree about 
it. [1951, 182–183]
8 Rawls’s later works promote pluralism, but the result is still (in Rawls’s 
own words) a “liberal conception of justice” (e.g., 1987, 18–22; 1993, 144–168). 
The pluralism espoused in 2001 (3–5), for example, employs an “overlapping 
consensus” (2001, 32–38, 192–195; cf. nn. 19, 20 below) coinciding with the 
general outlook supported by the moral principles advocated fifty years earlier 
(1951, 192–193). This is a common theme in the later works, where pluralism 
invariably comes with “liberalism” as a shared value or emergent mindset. 
This is taken up in greater detail in section 5 of this article.
9 The reference in “among other things” is to the other six of the seven 
criteria Rawls presents for considered moral judgments (1951, 181–183).
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This is Rawls’s sixth criterion for considered moral judg-
ments. Call it, to give it a name, the “stability requirement” 
(for considered moral judgments). This is not just for the sake 
of convenience in reference but also in conformity with his 
own usage as seen in the first sentence of the passage quoted 
above.
Being sensitive to this criterion requires special terminol-
ogy to avoid self-contradiction in discussing the decision pro-
cedure. For example, it would be contextually meaningless, as 
well as factually wrong, to claim that Rawls ignores the possi-
bility that the considered moral judgments of competent moral 
judges may vary across time and persons. This is because con-
sidered moral judgments are not the kinds of things that can 
vary in this way. They are, by definition, the kinds of moral 
judgments on which there is unanimous (or near-unanimous) 
agreement. Thankfully, avoiding semantic obstacles to what 
might otherwise turn out to be a fruitful discussion is a simple 
matter of making room for a new term, say, “sensible moral 
judgment,” referring to those moral judgments that satisfy all 
of Rawls’s criteria for considered moral judgments except the 
stability requirement. A considered moral judgment, then, is a 
sensible moral judgment on which all or nearly all competent 
moral judges agree.
Concerning reasonable moral principles, Rawls likewise 
requires a broad and enduring appeal in addition to the satis-
faction of various other conditions:10
Thirdly, the reasonableness of a principle is tested by seeing 
whether it can function in existing instances of conflicting 
opinion, and in new cases causing difficulty, to yield a result 
which, after criticism and discussion, seems to be acceptable 
to all, or nearly all, competent judges, and to conform to their 
intuitive notion of a reasonable decision. . . . In general, a 
principle evidences its reasonableness by being able to resolve 
moral perplexities which existed at the time of its formulation 
and which will exist in the future. [1951, 188]
This is Rawls’s third criterion for reasonable moral prin-
ciples. This, too, is a kind of stability requirement. It looks 
for a stability of sorts in moral principles. Reasonable moral 
principles should be useful both under existing conditions 
10 The other conditions invoked here are the remaining three of a total of 
four criteria Rawls requires of reasonable moral principles (1951, 187–189).
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and under other circumstances, at present or in the future. A 
duplication of terms, using the same word to refer to two dif-
ferent criteria, can lead to confusion. Instead of reusing “sta-
bility,” this criterion might better be called, again for the sake 
of convenience in reference, the “reliability requirement” (for 
reasonable moral principles).
The two requirements presumably shield the system from 
relativism. The stability requirement for considered moral 
judgments seems to be designed for the express purpose of 
preventing relativism from creeping into the decision proce-
dure. The reliability requirement for reasonable moral prin-
ciples seems to be designed to prevent ad hoc justifications 
of moral principles. The two requirements thus appear to be 
conceived as severally necessary, and perhaps jointly sufficient, 
to avoid relativism.
However, the clauses of universalism designed to ward off 
relativism threaten the compatibility of theory and application 
in Rawls’s outline and diminish the usefulness of the decision 
procedure itself. If all or nearly all competent moral judges at 
all times in all places were to agree on a set of sensible moral 
judgments, that might indeed rule out relativism. But would 
these competent judges actually endorse Rawls’s principles of 
justice? Would they even agree on anything at all, or at least 
on anything morally substantive? The questions point to two 
problems.
First, Rawls’s decision procedure is not likely to justify his 
own moral principles, because these particular moral prin-
ciples, which constitute a conception of justice as fairness, 
do not seem to explicate moral judgments that coincide with 
the sensible moral judgments of all or nearly all competent 
moral judges at all times in all places. The decision procedure 
requires competent moral judges to be in agreement, but not 
all, or even nearly all, competent moral judges will endorse the 
liberal conception of justice Rawls lays out as he demonstrates 
where the theory takes us in practice. If not, then Rawls’s par-
ticular moral principles cannot reasonably be said to explicate 
sensible moral judgments that meet the stability requirement. 
The question here is whether and how Rawls can deny, avoid, 
or justify a kind of dogmatism in advocating moral principles 
that explicate only some of the sensible moral judgments of 
Reliability 
requirement 
for reasonable 
moral  
principles.
Rawls’s  
decision  
procedure 
unlikely to 
justify his 
own moral 
principles.
122 • Volume XXX, Nos. 1 and 2, 2017 Necip Fikri Alican
only some of the competent moral judges. The term “dog-
matism” is intended not in any special sense, philosophical 
or otherwise, but in the ordinary sense of adopting a rigid 
position without sufficient evidence, or against evidence to 
the contrary, for example, in this case, including the likelihood 
that different competent moral judges would have different 
sensible moral judgments.
Second, it is possible that the clauses of universalism in 
Rawls’s decision procedure are so strong that the method 
he outlines is vacuous. It is possible, in other words, that no 
moral principles (and certainly no normatively useful ones) 
explicate moral judgments that coincide with the sensible 
moral judgments of all or nearly all competent moral judges 
at all times in all places. This is a more fundamental problem 
than the first because it underscores the possibility that, re-
gardless of whether Rawls’s moral principles are good ones, 
or ones justified by his own decision procedure, the decision 
procedure itself may not be very useful. Note that it is not 
necessary to consider this problem in its strongest form to ap-
preciate its gravity. It would be just as problematic for Rawls’s 
decision procedure if very few moral principles, or very few 
useful, significant, and substantive ones, were to explicate 
moral judgments that coincide with the sensible moral judg-
ments of all or nearly all competent moral judges at all times 
in all places.
Can Rawls, faced with these two problems, preserve his 
decision procedure and his principles of justice in the form 
in which he presents them?11 The remainder of this article is 
11 A third problem, actually a different way of thinking about the first 
problem, is the scenario where the decision procedure justifies Rawls’s moral 
principles but also at least one set of moral principles in conflict with those of 
Rawls. The assumption of unanimous (or near-unanimous) agreement makes 
this scenario irrelevant because unanimous or near-unanimous agreement 
on mutually inconsistent principles does not present a meaningful context 
for discussion. Anyone rejecting that assumption, however, could take up 
the first problem as two separate ones: (1) the possibility that the decision 
procedure does not justify Rawls’s moral principles; (2) the possibility that the 
decision procedure justifies Rawls’s moral principles along with alternatives 
to Rawls’s moral principles. There is, of course, no good reason to reject the 
prior assumption, since the appeal to competent judges can hardly be helpful 
without the assumption of substantial agreement, whether this be unanimous, 
nearly unanimous, widespread, or strong. Note also that, if the assumption 
Danger of 
vacuity.
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devoted to this question. To reiterate the general direction, the 
answer is that he might be able to preserve them to a degree, 
holding on to fundamentals, but that he must make conces-
sions. Regarding the first problem, he must admit to substan-
tial dogmatism and look outside the system for a way to justify 
the dogmatism as opposed to denying it or trying to avoid 
it while remaining within the system. Regarding the second 
problem, he must relax the universalism in his decision pro-
cedure to alleviate (but not eliminate) the difficulty that it can 
be vacuous and otiose as a method of ethical justification. He 
could perhaps reposition the decision procedure as a justifica-
tion model for a community of sufficiently like-minded moral 
agents rather than a universal platform (the two being the 
same if everyone happens to be in that community).
Before establishing the existence and implications of dog-
matism in the way Rawls promotes the principles he does in 
the “Outline,” it may help to examine his claim to objectivity 
in the same work:
[T]he objectivity or the subjectivity of moral knowledge turns, 
not on the question [1] whether ideal value entities exist or 
[2] whether moral judgments are caused by emotions or [3] 
whether there is a variety of moral codes the world over, but 
simply on the question: [4] does there exist a reasonable method 
for validating and invalidating given or proposed moral rules 
and those decisions made on the basis of them? [1951, 177]
According to Rawls, then, what makes a method objective 
is that it is reasonable. But this is a technical conception of ob-
jectivity. It is not the kind of objectivity that precludes dogma-
tism, which need not be unreasonable, nor even unjustifiable. 
Might not conflicting principles be supported equally well by 
equally reasonable decision procedures, perhaps even by the 
very same one, thus making any choice dogmatic—or, worse, 
arbitrary—and in that sense and to that extent “non-objective”? 
Rawls himself admits that his decision procedure may not be 
the only reasonable one:
There is no way of knowing ahead of time how to find and 
were rejected, this would remove the grounds originally invoked for suspecting 
the decision procedure might not justify Rawls’s moral principles. Hence, 
the first problem would, in that case, be transformed not into the two 
separate problems described in this note but into just the second of those two 
problems.
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formulate these reasonable principles. Indeed, we cannot even 
be certain that they exist, and it is well known that there are no 
mechanical methods of discovery. In what follows, however, 
a method will be described, and it remains for the reader to 
judge for himself to what extent it is, or can be, successful. 
[1951, 178]
The decision procedure Rawls outlines is, in fact, objec-
tive in the standard sense, that is, in the sense of impartial-
ity (whether or not it is also objective in the sense depicted 
above). And its objectivity is so clear as to require no further 
argument. There is no inherent breach of impartiality in the 
position that moral principles are justified insofar as they ex-
plicate the considered moral judgments of competent moral 
judges. This is not to say that the decision procedure cannot be 
manipulated to favor certain outcomes or to suppress others. 
But that sort of departure from objectivity is grounded in the 
manipulation of the system and not in the system itself. The 
decision procedure is and remains objective.
Application is a different matter. Even if Rawls cannot 
reasonably be held responsible, as the designer of the system, 
for any breakdown or transgressions in practice, especially 
for any in the form of misuse, he could still be faulted, as an 
ordinary operator, for abusing or misusing the system during 
application. This is the possibility that Rawls the moral agent 
may be at fault even where Rawls the moral engineer is not. 
As it turns out, however, and as I aim to show, he needs to 
reconsider what he does in both roles.
The following two sections elucidate these two issues. The 
next section (section 3) is on the specific matter of the applica-
tion bias keeping Rawls’s distinctive moral principles from 
being justified by his universalistic decision procedure. The 
section after that (section 4) is on the general problem concern-
ing the possible sterility of the decision procedure as a model 
of ethical justification.
3. Application Bias
This section demonstrates that Rawls’s principles of justice 
are dogmatic in the sense that they are not justified by his deci-
sion procedure, which requires the unanimous (or near-unani-
mous) agreement of competent moral judges, and further, that 
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this is a real problem he can neither deny nor avoid without 
altering either his principles or his decision procedure or both. 
The reasonability of denial and the possibility of avoidance 
are worth considering separately and seriously as either one 
would absolve Rawls of the charges advanced here.
Denying the dogmatism is an almost instinctive response 
in this case. This requires not just rejecting the charge but also 
giving good reasons for doing so. One way of pursuing this 
possibility is to start with a context of moral conflict where 
the principles espoused by Rawls clash with those espoused 
by others. The acid test here is whether those other principles 
have a comparable claim to reasonableness.
A setting of historical and cultural conflict presents suit-
able testing grounds. This is not because the problem itself is 
specifically historical or inherently cultural but because super-
imposing historical and cultural dimensions can help visualize 
the problem better at least as a first approximation. Suppose, 
then, that the task is to compare judges and judgments across 
history and between cultures. Consider, to begin, the histori-
cal dimension, which will almost always bring with it a cul-
tural perspective: Do Rawls’s moral principles explicate moral 
judgments that coincide with the sensible moral judgments of 
historically competent moral judges? They do not. His prin-
ciples of justice, even in their earliest versions (1951, 192–193), 
and perhaps more clearly in their later versions in subsequent 
works, explicate moral judgments that take justice as fairness. 
Such an account stands in contrast to some older conceptions 
of justice, which involve the production and preservation of 
distinctions in class, race, and gender, and which were gener-
ally considered to depend for their justification, at least in part, 
on a conviction that they reflect the natural order of the world.
We may note, for example, that the ancient Greeks held 
moral principles that explicate sensible moral judgments al-
lowing and even requiring class distinctions. The problem for 
Rawls would then be to justify dismissing the sensible moral 
judgments of competent moral judges in, say, Periclean Athens 
in favor of the moral judgments of their more liberal descen-
dants in modern-day Western democracies.
The solution seems simple enough: The people of Periclean 
Athens were not competent moral judges and their moral 
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judgments are therefore irrelevant. This makes them neither 
incompetent nor immoral, pointing instead to a technical dis-
qualification: They do not satisfy the criteria pertinent to the 
designation “competent moral judge” (1951, 178–181). Do they 
all fail in this regard? Probably not, but that is not important. 
The point is not that no one in Periclean Athens could possibly 
have been a competent moral judge but that Periclean Athens 
is not the place to go looking for competent moral judges.
This otherwise appealing answer is nevertheless unac-
ceptable because it begs the question of the competence of 
the relevant judges. It is wrong to dismiss the sensible moral 
judgments of the people of Periclean Athens merely because 
their conception of justice or their moral outlook is repugnant 
to our own moral sensibilities. Doing so violates the rules of 
Rawls’s own decision procedure:
a competent judge has not been defined by what he says in 
particular cases, nor by what principles he expresses or adopts. 
. . . Obviously if a competent judge were defined as one who 
applies those principles, this reasoning would be circular. Thus 
a competent judge must not be defined in terms of what he 
says or by what principles he uses. [1951, 180]
The alternative is to refuse to recognize as a competent 
moral judge anyone who fails to satisfy all the criteria for com-
petent moral judges. As for the judgments of those who fully 
qualify as competent moral judges, Rawls may further refuse 
to recognize as a sensible moral judgment any judgment that 
fails to satisfy all the criteria for sensible moral judgments.12 
The pertinent question in this case is whether all (or nearly all) 
judges and judgments that contradict the conception of justice 
as fairness fail to satisfy some criterion or other. A case of this 
sort may be made piecemeal against this or that particular 
challenge, but such a recalcitrant approach is not sustainable 
as a general defense.
Could Rawls perhaps invoke the stability requirement, the 
very criterion that marks the difference between “sensible” 
12 Strictly speaking, sensible moral judgments have no formal criteria, at 
least not in the original work. Rather, they are invented here, in the present 
article, for the sake of circumventing a specific semantic obstacle in the 
discussion. That said, the derivative criteria for sensible moral judgments 
can be taken as the formal criteria for considered moral judgments minus the 
stability requirement.
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and “considered” moral judgments? Could he contend that 
Periclean moral judgments fail the stability test, as they clearly 
have no place in our world, where a liberal moral outlook and 
a conception of justice as fairness prevail? But whose world 
is that? Where exactly does this outlook, this conception, pre-
vail? Yes, the old makes room for the new. And the ways of 
the ancient Greeks are a thing of the past. But much of what is 
problematic (for Rawls’s decision procedure) about Periclean 
Athens is readily instantiated in modern day India to take just 
one contemporary example. At the very least, the class distinc-
tions are still with us. How is this not “our” world?
India is just one example, chosen because the culture there 
is one of the great traditions familiar everywhere. But com-
parable problems can be found elsewhere. People in various 
Middle Eastern cultures, for instance, still sell their daughters 
into marriage shortly after their first menstrual cycle, as ar-
ranged through prior verbal contract, typically upon the birth 
of the child. Justice demands it. Is there room for this kind of 
justice in Rawls’s decision procedure? There should be.13 But 
we never see it with Rawls in charge of application.
Later refinements in Rawls’s metaphors and thought exper-
iments for ethical justification help obviate counterexamples 
such as modern day slavery, an institution unlikely to find 
much support behind a veil of ignorance. But counterexamples 
do not have to be focused tightly on class distinctions or on so-
cial practices or institutions bordering on slavery to be success-
ful. It should not be too hard to come up with a scenario that 
divides competent moral judges (and even contractors behind 
a veil of ignorance as envisaged later) without so extensively 
contradicting our current sensibilities as the thought of slavery 
does.
One can surely imagine a moral, social, or political platform 
13 I am not claiming that selling one’s daughter into marriage is just. Nor 
am I claiming that a good decision procedure for ethics should make room for 
selling one’s daughter into marriage. I am claiming that, given the exposition 
of Rawls (1951), his decision procedure for ethics should (by design) have 
room for selling one’s daughter into marriage if that is something agreeable 
to competent moral judges. The scenario should not be ruled out before it is 
processed through the decision procedure. Any rejection should instead be the 
result of such processing. The case should be taken to the judges instead of the 
judges being selected on the basis of how they would decide the case.
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that is, unlike class distinctions or outright slavery, consistent 
with Western ideals yet inconsistent with Rawls’s favored 
worldview. Or leaving Rawls out of the equation, there could 
conceivably be two or more competing (mutually inconsistent) 
conceptions, outlooks, or paradigms each of which is broadly 
consistent with sociocultural norms in modern Western societ-
ies.14 In political economy, for example, both the principles of 
social welfare and the principles of laissez-faire might explicate 
moral judgments that coincide with the sensible moral judg-
ments of competent moral judges. Professional economists 
and lawmakers may (and actually do) disagree not only on 
policy issues but also, and more fundamentally, on the right 
choice among competing economic systems. Yet nothing in 
that choice signals a violation of any of the qualification crite-
ria for Rawlsian judges or judgments.15
Rawls proceeds as if people of certain qualifications medi-
tating in a certain way would never arrive at moral judgments 
that can be explicated by contradictory or competing moral 
principles. This is an axiomatic component of the decision 
procedure. But if the example from comparative economic 
systems is a good one—and if it is not, one that is may still be 
found—then the assumption is not justified. We may safely 
predict that a good many conflicts can be resolved by show-
ing that the opposing view fails to satisfy some criterion or 
other in the Rawlsian framework. But this cannot be a blanket 
answer. It is unreasonable to insist that any and every conflict 
with Rawls’s principles of justice is due to the opposing view’s 
failing to meet a legitimate condition.
Can Rawls instead avoid the dogmatism before it hap-
pens, as opposed to denying it after it does, by reformulating 
his decision procedure to justify his principles while at the 
same time salvaging its universalistic character? One way to 
14 For the sake of argument, let us set aside the debate on whether a typical 
modern Western society is a real phenomenon or a heuristic device to speak 
of norms and averages while instead dealing with a heterogeneous data set 
where nothing, or not much at all, actually corresponds to what is taken to be 
typical. I will gladly yield on this point.
15 Rawls would likely subordinate the principles of free enterprise to those 
of state intervention in social welfare, but he could not, if he were to make 
that choice, justify it through his decision procedure. There is nothing in that 
procedure either to facilitate or to validate that kind of choice.
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attempt this might be to redefine the criteria for competent 
moral judges to bypass the problem of dogmatism, perhaps by 
stipulating that a competent moral judge be familiar with all 
or nearly all philosophies and philosophers, thereby taking all 
their sensible moral judgments into account while being biased 
neither toward nor against these judgments.16 The purpose of 
such an amendment would be to ensure as far as possible that 
every sensible moral judgment gets a fair shot at being admit-
ted into the class of considered moral judgments. This, in turn, 
would presumably avoid dogmatism while preserving both the 
decision procedure and the principles of justice (as fairness).
But the level of competence required would be nothing 
short of sagacity. Some sort of limiting scope might help ease 
the burden. What principles of selection should be used to 
determine the areas of expertise to be required of a competent 
moral judge? Or is this really a question in the right direction? 
True, a competent moral judge is unlikely to know everything 
required to satisfy an amendment requiring an open-ended 
expansion of the base of competence and expertise. On the 
other hand, being selective about the scope of knowledge to be 
sought seems to perpetrate the dogmatism such an amendment 
would be designed to avoid in the first place. One way out of 
this dilemma is to make use of the plurality of judges. Rawls 
does not limit himself to a single “ideal observer.” He speaks of 
“competent moral judges” in the plural. Perhaps we can con-
strue this as a panel of competent moral judges in which each 
judge is an expert in one area. In this way, it might be possible 
to maximize coverage of the sensible moral judgments held by 
all or nearly all philosophies and philosophers.
However, the burden seems too great, even with a division 
of labor, unless the panel is to be indefinitely and impractically 
large in terms of membership. Also, a division of labor might 
threaten the attainment of consensus, or even near-consensus. 
Furthermore, competent moral judges possessing such a 
16 This scenario assumes that all sensible moral judgments of all competent 
moral judges are taken into account, but it does not extend to moral principles. 
Using moral principles to infer or derive moral judgments would violate the 
decision procedure. Rawls explicitly forbids the derivation of considered moral 
judgments from moral principles: See his second comment (1951, 180) on his 
criteria for competent moral judges and his seventh criterion (1951, 183) for 
considered moral judgments.
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magnitude of knowledge in both scope and depth lose their 
“ordinary person” characteristics, which Rawls is eager to 
preserve.17
To summarize: (1) The kind of dogmatism discussed here is 
indeed attributable to Rawls. (2) Rawls cannot truthfully deny 
this dogmatism. (3) Nor can he avoid the dogmatism without 
compromising his principles or modifying his decision proce-
dure. (4) All this poses a systemwide threat because his own 
decision procedure, which does not allow dogmatism, does 
not justify his particular principles of justice, which can only 
be defended dogmatically.
Even when focusing on a single work, in this case, the 
first publication of Rawls, straying beyond that point is often 
tempting, and at times necessary, especially to avoid a pos-
sible misunderstanding at a critical juncture. This is such a 
juncture. Specifically, the third item in the preceding list may 
make one wonder whether reflective equilibrium, particu-
larly the wide kind, might not take care of these problems.18 
17 Rawls contends that competent moral judges are ordinary people in 
many respects. This comes out in his enumeration (1951, 178–179) of the 
qualifications required and in his subsequent provisions (1951, 180–181) 
concerning those qualifications. He maintains, for example, that “what we 
call ‘moral insight’ is the possession of the normally intelligent man as well 
as of the more brilliant” and that “a competent moral judge need not be more 
than normally intelligent” (1951, 178). He also defines the knowledge required 
of the competent moral judge in terms of what is “reasonable to expect the 
average intelligent man to know” (1951, 178). He claims further that he 
selects competent moral judges “not by means of characteristics which are the 
privileged possession of any race, class, or group, but which can and often do 
belong, at least to a certain degree, to men everywhere” (1951, 181).
18 The literature on reflective equilibrium, wide or narrow, is enormous. 
Perhaps true of most Rawlsian themes, it is particularly pronounced in 
this one, largely because other prominent philosophers have comparably 
prominent roles here, including Nelson Goodman (1954), who is widely 
credited for having inspired the concept, and Norman Daniels (1979, 1980a, 
1980b, 1996), who is often said to have perfected it, not to mention many 
who have adopted, developed, or rejected it. While it is Rawls who coined 
the term “reflective equilibrium” (1971, 20–21, 48–53), and Rawls again who 
distinguished between “wide” and “narrow” forms of it (1974–1975, 8), the 
question is whether he borrowed it from Goodman’s (1954) analogous albeit 
unnamed approach to the problem of induction. Recently, Mäkinen and 
Kakkuri-Knuuttila (2013) have argued against the standard assumption of 
an influence on Rawls by Goodman, instead tracing the Rawlsian origin of 
reflective equilibrium to Rawls (1955) himself, in other words, finding room 
for independent development, which becomes plausible as they move the 
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Importing the concept of wide reflective equilibrium into the 
setting of the “Outline” seems like a promising response to 
complications arising in and about the scenario of a division 
of labor. These “problems” have all along been little more than 
playful scenarios introduced in the spirit of a devil’s advocate 
conducting thought experiments in a dialectical effort to sort 
out the justification mechanism Rawls advocates. Be that as it 
may, let us suppose that the wrinkles are ironed out through 
wide reflective equilibrium.
This would mean that we no longer need to worry about 
the ideological harmonization of competent moral judges, 
considered moral judgments, and reasonable moral principles. 
We would also not have to trouble ourselves with the dynam-
ics of the reciprocal adjustments required toward equilibrium. 
With everything iterated into alignment, the components of the 
decision procedure would be in optimal operating efficiency, 
jointly constituting a better model of ethical reasoning than the 
prototype. We would, in short, be assured of a smooth opera-
tion. But the quality of the operation, so to speak, never was 
a threat or obstacle to begin with. The purportedly objective 
decision procedure is, in fact, objective. It always has been. The 
problem here is the dogmatism that defies the objectivity of the 
decision procedure already in place. Replacing that model with 
one boasting a more efficient justification mechanism, as prom-
ised by wide reflective equilibrium, is not going to make the 
dogmatism go away. It never did. That is to say, it never did 
in real life, as the basic design underwent change after change 
Rawlsian origin from its usual spot in 1971 (Theory) to a new beginning in 
1955 (“Two Concepts of Rules”). However, the question of outside influence 
remains open. Quine (1951), for example, seems just as likely a candidate as 
Goodman (1954). Quine’s holism, evident as early as his “Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism” (1951, 38), is not a far cry from reflective equilibrium. Taking 
this route, one may then wish to follow up on the debt of inspiration Quine 
acknowledges to Rudolf Carnap in the first edition of that article (1951, 38), 
adding Pierre Duhem in a footnote to the revised edition (1953, 41, n. 17). But 
why stop at Quine? A noted historian of moral and political philosophy such 
as Rawls would have surely felt the influence of Aristotle, who had a proclivity 
for reasoning in a fashion that may well count as a forerunner to the method of 
reflective equilibrium (Nicomachean Ethics 1094b13–27, 1095a31–b3, 1098a20–b8, 
1098b26–29, 1109a20–b26, 1138b18–35, 1145b1–7, 1146b6–8). Indeed, Rawls 
himself locates the origin of the method in Aristotle, though he also professes 
a scholarly debt to “most classical British writers through Sidgwick” (1971, 51, 
n. 26).
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while the moral mindset of Rawls himself did not. Rawls the 
moral engineer kept coming up with newer and better deci-
sion procedures for ethics, but Rawls the moral agent contin-
ued to hold the same position.
The liberal bias has always been there whether Rawls ar-
rived at it through a rocky process or with admirable finesse. 
Wide reflective equilibrium turns out to support Rawls’s own 
moral, social, and political outlook, much in the way that his 
competent moral judges do, with both appeals enjoying the 
same convenient validation claimed by every local religion in 
the world as the only true religion clashing with a myriad of 
misguided ones. Perhaps wide reflective equilibrium prom-
ises greater objectivity than the original decision procedure. 
But, again, the problem has not been with the promise. The 
objectivity guaranteed by the original decision procedure was 
perfectly acceptable from the outset. It just somehow never 
panned out, with a succession of outcomes remaining forever 
skewed in favor of the moral sensibilities of Rawls: sensibili-
ties consistent with liberalism as Rawls himself is happy to 
acknowledge. This, and not the operating efficiency of the 
decision procedure, is the real problem, at least in this portion 
of the present article.
The next section takes up the second problem under con-
sideration: the possibility that the decision procedure itself 
may be otiose or even altogether vacuous. This problem is an 
extension or reflection of the first (or vice versa). The two are 
so closely related that the difference between them is essen-
tially one of degree. In the first problem, the number of judges 
in agreement is not sufficient to justify Rawls’s principles of 
justice. In the second, the number of judges in agreement is 
not sufficient to justify any moral principles at all or at least 
any substantive moral principles.
4. System Sterility
To recall the terminology adopted for the sake of clarity, 
considered moral judgments are sensible moral judgments 
that are acceptable to all or nearly all competent moral judges. 
This much is true by definition. The distinction makes it pos-
sible, without contradiction, to interpret Rawls as holding that 
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there is some core of sensible moral judgments (“considered 
moral judgments” being the wrong term here because they are 
already presumed stable in the manner required) transcending 
time, culture, and ideology, and thereby being acceptable to or 
accepted by any competent moral judge at any time, which is 
what makes those sensible moral judgments considered moral 
judgments.
Something similar to this appeal to a core consensus is 
evident in Rawls’s later works as well. Such evidence starts to 
show up as early as Theory:
Being designed to reconcile by reason, justification proceeds 
from what all parties to the discussion hold in common. Ide-
ally, to justify a conception of justice to someone is to give him 
a proof of its principles from premises that we both accept, 
these principles having in turn consequences that match our 
considered judgments. [1971, 580–581]
The gist of this passage is that justification should proceed 
from premises agreed upon in advance and acceptable to all 
parties, hence from an objective core of moral judgments on 
which there is prior consensus.19 This is a plausible proposal 
as far as a decision procedure is concerned. But any attempt 
to justify Rawlsian principles of justice in this way presumes 
an agreement not only on basic moral intuitions or on the 
building blocks of ethical theory but also on substantive moral 
issues. Assuming a point (or region) of convergence in con-
nection with basic moral judgments is reasonable enough, but 
prior consensus on answers to substantive moral questions 
cannot be a necessary, or even acceptable, starting point for 
ethical justification: It cannot be necessary, because it requires 
too much; it cannot be acceptable, because it begs the question 
of justification.
To be fair, Rawls does not take his principles of justice to 
19 This is different from the later (and now more familiar) notion of 
“overlapping consensus,” which Rawls characterizes as a “consensus of 
comprehensive, or partially comprehensive, religious, philosophical, and 
moral doctrines” (2001, xvii) and defines as “a consensus in which the same 
political conception is endorsed by the opposing reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines that gain a significant body of adherents and endure from one 
generation to the next” (2001, 184). Rawls is clear about this: “The idea of an 
overlapping consensus was not used in Theory” (2001, 186). He notes further: 
“The term is used once, Theory, §59: 340, but for a different purpose than my 
present one” (2001, 186, n. 9).
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be justified automatically with an appeal to a core of prior 
consensus. He finds the consensus necessary, not sufficient, 
for ethical justification. Still, the question is whether he forces 
his conception of justice into the core of prior consensus. That, 
indeed, would be to beg the question.
A proper answer requires a closer look at the notion of a 
core consensus. Questions abound: What constitutes a core 
of consensus? Which sensible moral judgments are included 
in it? Who is to choose the judgments to be included, and by 
what principles of selection?
The very essence of a core consensus suggests that much 
is left out: The core is not required to contain all the sensible 
moral judgments of all the competent moral judges, or even 
to include at least one sensible moral judgment by each com-
petent moral judge. It is sufficient that the sensible moral 
judgments in the core be of a sort that would, upon consider-
ation or reflection, be acceptable to all or nearly all competent 
moral judges. This is what Rawls means by “considered moral 
judgment,” and the concept of the core brings out the distinc-
tion drawn earlier between considered moral judgments and 
sensible moral judgments. The core, by definition, consists of 
all and only considered moral judgments. Any sensible moral 
judgment that makes its way into the core becomes a consid-
ered moral judgment.
That said, a core of such universal appeal is unlikely to go 
beyond very basic judgments, and those, either severally or 
collectively, would have to be otiose, contributing nothing, 
or very little, toward the moral enlightenment of the moral 
agent. Sensible moral judgments in such a sterile core would 
be jointly insufficient to support a complete and coherent set 
of moral principles. In other words, the class of all considered 
moral judgments is either completely or very nearly devoid of 
useful sensible moral judgments, or it contains only unhelpful 
sensible moral judgments.
But what is this distinction between useful and useless (or 
between helpful and unhelpful) sensible moral judgments? 
Quite simply, the useful and helpful ones are those that make 
a real contribution toward the adjudication of significant 
moral issues, conflicts, and problems, in short, the hard cases, 
while the useless and unhelpful ones are those that do not fit 
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this description. Consider two specific examples: A judgment 
such as “it is morally wrong for parents to have their children 
executed by hired assassins to get them out of the house” 
is probably one that would be acceptable to all or nearly all 
competent moral judges, and it represents the kind of judg-
ment that could be found in an objective core, but it is useless 
and unhelpful in the way just described. On the other hand, a 
judgment such as “it is morally wrong for a woman to have the 
fetus in her womb killed and extracted by medical personnel 
to terminate the pregnancy” is probably not one that would be 
acceptable to all or nearly all competent moral judges, and it is 
not one that could make its way into the objective core, yet it 
is the kind of sensible moral judgment that captures the issues 
that actually matter to us, whether as moral philosophers or as 
ordinary persons.
In the same vein, useful and helpful judgments are sub-
stantive, while useless and unhelpful ones tend to be trivial. It 
may be objected, on behalf of Rawls, that requiring substantive 
moral judgments to be included in the core to make it useful, 
while at the same time prohibiting them from being included 
so as not to beg the question, is to create an artificial dilemma 
for Rawls, one for which he is not accountable. It may thus be 
argued that where the question-begging really takes place is 
in opposing Rawls in this way, that is, in reducing considered 
moral judgments to trivial moral judgments. It may be object-
ed, moreover, that the distinction between what may and may 
not be admitted into the objective core is biased against Rawls, 
making his decision procedure look circular when it really is 
not, and that the proper distinction is not between “trivial” 
and “substantive” moral judgments but between “basic” and 
“derivative” moral judgments.
Such persistent protest calls for consideration. The two 
examples just given, so the objection goes, are both irrelevant 
because they are both derivative. Neither one can be included 
in the core, because the core contains only basic judgments. 
Both the judgment that “it is morally wrong for parents to have 
their children executed by hired assassins to get them out of 
the house” and the judgment that “it is morally wrong for a 
woman to have the fetus in her womb killed and extracted by 
medical personnel to terminate the pregnancy” are derived 
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from a basic moral judgment such as “murder is wrong” 
(or to add specificity, a judgment such as “it is wrong to kill 
people unjustly”). This basic judgment can be included in 
the core, but the two derivative ones cannot. This is because, 
even where everyone agrees on the basic judgment, it does not 
automatically entail the two derivative judgments. The possi-
bilities are endless in manipulating a basic judgment to derive 
others, even ones that contradict one another.
What follows from this objection? Suppose that the distinc-
tion between trivial and substantive moral judgments is, in 
fact, irrelevant, and that the appropriate distinction is between 
basic and derivative moral judgments. If only basic sensible 
moral judgments can be admitted into the core, then all con-
sidered moral judgments must be basic ones. Then so much 
the worse for Rawls. Basic moral judgments can no more justi-
fy a moral principle than can trivial moral judgments. Calling 
it something else does not change the nature of the judgment. 
One might imagine unanimous or widespread agreement on 
a great many trivial or basic moral judgments, and one might 
imagine unanimous or widespread agreement on very few 
substantive or derivative moral judgments, but neither kind of 
agreement would yield a core rich enough to provide anything 
like a complete set of moral principles. On the other hand, one 
could also imagine agreement on a plethora of substantive or 
derivative sensible moral judgments, but then the agreement 
would not be unanimous or even widespread. The more one 
enriches the set of moral judgments on which prior consensus 
is presumed, the less likely actual agreement becomes. And it 
does not matter whether the enrichment is in number, signifi-
cance (trivial vs. substantive), or level (basic vs. derivative).
The question is whether Rawls requires only a basic kind 
of agreement necessary to any moral theory or assumes too 
much to begin with. When the starting point takes many if 
not most disagreements in attitude to be settled before theory 
construction begins, the resulting theory will be circular, justi-
fying what people already believe to be right or wrong. The is-
sue turns on whether a core general enough to reflect unanim-
ity, or a very high level of agreement, can at the same time be 
rich enough for the set of sensible moral judgments it contains 
to play the crucial role Rawls envisions it to play in ethical 
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justification. If the core is general enough to secure a respect-
able consensus, it just may be too general to facilitate theory 
construction. If it is genuinely helpful in theory construction, it 
may not be general enough to count as a consensus.
To recapitulate, pausing for a provisional conclusion, the 
answer to whether Rawls’s decision procedure is vacuous or 
otiose is that it is not vacuous, since it can, in any event, justify 
some moral principle or other, but that it is dangerously close 
to being otiose, because it cannot reasonably be held to justify 
very many substantive moral principles.
A final objection on behalf of Rawls may be that the cri-
tique confuses two different things, a prior consensus and a 
final consensus: The passage cited above from Theory (1971, 
580–581) requires a core of prior consensus as a starting point 
in ethical justification, whereas the agreement of competent 
moral judges on considered moral judgments, as depicted in 
the “Outline,” is not a prior consensus but a final consensus, 
which follows from, and is built upon, deliberations and modi-
fications on a prior consensus, much like the one described in 
Theory. Thus, the objection runs, while it is true that the core 
of prior consensus, from which theory justification begins, can 
include only basic moral judgments, it is permissible to include 
derivative moral judgments (and even substantive moral judg-
ments) in the core of final consensus.
This is true but irrelevant. The objection brings up a distinc-
tion which, in its proper sense, has in fact been observed by 
the present critique.20 The relevant consensus, whether prior or 
final, is about moral judgments, whereas the justification prom-
ised by the decision procedure is about moral principles. The 
only essential feature of a “prior” consensus (always on moral 
judgments) is that it precedes the justification process (always 
of moral principles). That is the sense of priority intended by 
the term (the level of complexity being an accidental feature). 
A “final” consensus, in contrast, is the agreement prevailing 
20 This is still not about the question of an “overlapping consensus,” which 
is a more specific concern than the generic distinction between a prior and 
final consensus. See n. 19 above. Any talk of consensus, however, particularly 
with rigorous distinctions, is a natural reminder of Rawls’s “overlapping 
consensus.” If any association were to be attempted at this point, it would be 
safer to say that the overlapping consensus is closer to what is depicted here 
as a final consensus.
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after justification. There is no room for confusing the two. The 
point of the critique here (in this section) is that the decision 
procedure Rawls recommends may possibly be operationally 
sterile in the sense of persistently lacking the level of consen-
sus required for the kind of justification proposed. And the 
practical counterpart of this systemic problem, as discussed in 
the previous section, is that the justification Rawls needs for 
the principles he advocates requires too much prior agreement 
on moral judgments.21
How, then, does Rawls arrive at his conception of justice as 
fairness? Is it the natural result of his decision procedure for 
ethics? Or does he manipulate the system, if ever so slightly, 
starting with a core of prior consensus that has a sufficiently 
liberal touch for the principles of justice to come out just right? 
The evidence is not conclusive either way, but the second 
possibility presents a nagging uncertainty. To take any moral 
principles as rich as those that represent Rawls’s conception 
of justice and to push them (or whatever input yields that 
output) into a core of consensus is to beg the question. Strictly 
speaking, it is meaningless to speak of pushing any moral 
principles at all, rich or otherwise, into a core consensus, 
which is defined as containing only moral judgments and not 
moral principles. But what is meant, at any rate, is rigging the 
system in some way, whether this be done with principles or 
with judgments.
21 A more meaningful objection, though still not a conclusive one, would 
be that the prior consensus can be strong and rich enough, without including 
derivative or substantive moral judgments, to help adjudicate the tough cases 
and to formulate complex moral principles. The consensus envisaged here 
would presumably proceed from a minimal base of agreement sufficient for 
arriving at a greater base of agreement, a process gradually unfolding toward 
an eventual meeting of the minds on important matters. But this, again, seems 
to be wishful thinking. Assumptions for the sake of argument are perfectly 
acceptable in thought experiments, but once the arguments are laid out, the 
conclusions are no stronger than the assumptions. There is no such consensus. 
We do disagree on abortion, on gun control, on genetic engineering, and so on. 
Evidently, whatever moral convergence we draw on to decide such matters is 
not a strong enough base of agreement to bring us together on such matters.
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5. Broader Context
Are the foregoing problems restricted to the “Outline” of 
1951? Despite a primary focus on the “Outline,” largely for 
the sake of specificity, I have been trying, where possible and 
relevant, to bring out connections with Rawls’s later works. A 
limited effort of that sort is no substitute for a comprehensive 
survey. While there may (or may not) be room to object that 
Rawls’s later thought is free of the problems discussed here, 
such an objection cannot fairly be pursued as a speculative 
point of protest without concrete evidence. That effort would 
also have to be specific, not to mention comprehensive, thus 
preferably drawing on a single theme ranging over multiple 
works. A good example—both specific and comprehensive—is 
that of Rawls’s pluralism.
The objection in that context would be that saddling Rawls 
with dogmatism is wrong in view of his later move to embrace 
pluralism (e.g., 1987, 18–22; 1993, 144–168; 2001, 3–5). But this 
pluralistic turn is not necessarily a turn away from dogmatism. 
Even as he embraces pluralism, for example, in a later paper 
on “overlapping consensus” (1987, 1–25)—before the second 
edition of Theory (1999) and before either edition of Political 
Liberalism (1993/2005)—his thoughts turn to a liberal concep-
tion of justice: “As I have said, the most reasonable political 
conception of justice for a democratic regime will be, broadly 
speaking, liberal” (1987, 17).22
Pluralism is indeed a common thread running through 
much of Rawls’s mature output. The theme of pluralism, 
however, goes hand-in-hand with that of an “overlapping con-
sensus” (2001, 32–38, 192–195), which, in turn, works in favor 
of political liberalism. Diluting pluralism through an appeal 
to an overlapping consensus (which conveniently happens to 
favor a certain type of outcome) is no better than ignoring or 
rejecting it through an appeal to competent moral judges (who 
consistently happen to favor a certain type of outcome). The 
competent moral judges are replaced by “reasonable persons” 
who are supposed to see in time, and typically over genera-
tions, that a conception of “justice as fairness” (which Rawls 
22 This liberal conception of justice is explored throughout the work in 
question (1987, 1–25) and articulated specifically on p. 18, including especially 
n. 27. See 1993, 3–46, for a fuller exposition.
Pluralistic 
turn not  
necessarily 
a turn away 
from  
dogmatism.
140 • Volume XXX, Nos. 1 and 2, 2017 Necip Fikri Alican
identifies in his later works as a “liberal conception of justice”) 
is an ideal they all hold in common, despite any ideological 
differences they may otherwise continue to have. This is the 
overlapping consensus invoked in justification.23
This gradual realization is a manifestation of the “reason-
able moral psychology” (e.g., 1987, 22, 23) expected of every-
one (specifically, of every citizen in a constitutional democ-
racy). Rawls often appeals to moral psychology, whether or 
not he uses that exact term:
[1] Note also that the success of liberal institutions may come 
as a discovery of a new social possibility: the possibility 
of a reasonably harmonious and stable pluralist society. 
[1987, 23]
[2] The kind of stability required of justice as fairness is based, 
then, on its being a liberal political view, one that aims to be 
acceptable to citizens as reasonable and rational, as well as 
free and equal, and so as addressed to their public reason. 
[2001, 185]
And he uses that exact term in several places, including, for 
example, Theory (1971, 490–496 [=1999, 429–434]), the “Reply 
to Habermas” (1988, 270), and Political Liberalism (1993, 86–88, 
cf. 158–168). Moreover, he qualifies the psychology in question 
as a “reasonable” one, thus referring explicitly to a “reasonable 
moral psychology,” among other places, in his treatment of 
“overlapping consensus” (1987, 22, 23) and in his explication of 
“justice as fairness” in the Restatement (2001, 195–198).24
This is a reflection of Rawls’s general tendency to claim 
“reasonableness” for the key ideas, premises, and assumptions 
in his moral, social, and political outlook.25 While we all want 
our ideas, arguments, and positions to be reasonable, calling 
23 Rawls provides succinct definitions (2001, xvii, 184) of “overlapping 
consensus” as well as detailed discussions of it (1985, 225–226; 1987, 1–25; 
1993, 133–172; 2001, 32–38, 192–195). See n. 19 above for one such definition.
24 In Theory (1971), his appeals are variously to the “facts” (pp. 143, 176), 
“laws” (p. 177), and “principles” (pp. 490–496) of moral psychology, and 
ultimately to a “general knowledge” (p. 176) of it.
25 Even a cursory survey of a single work (2001) shows a trend: “reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine” (pp. 34, 183, 184); “reasonable conception” (p. 37); 
“reasonable disagreement” (p. 35); “reasonable doctrine” (p. 37); “reasonable 
human psychology” (p. 184); “reasonable moral psychology” (p. 181); 
“reasonable overlapping consensus” (pp. 32–38); “reasonable person” (pp. 32–
38); “reasonable pluralism” (pp. 32–38).
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something “reasonable” does not make it so. No doubt, this is 
not what Rawls thinks either, but he does introduce reason-
ableness, in each case, as an assumption, from which, together 
with other premises, he draws certain conclusions. And the 
conclusions are invariably in favor of liberalism. Given that 
arguments are meant to support convictions, all the arguments 
adduced for a certain position will naturally be in favor of that 
position, but the support becomes questionable when it rests 
on postulated reasonableness. Rawls works with a significant 
correlation (far greater than would be expected of random 
outcomes with independent variables) between the reasonable 
and the liberal, whereby specifying reasonableness as a formal 
criterion somehow always points to a liberal outcome.
It may be objected that Rawls is using “reasonable” in a 
special sense, anchored to his constructivism, such that “rea-
sonable” is meant not so much to convey reasonableness in the 
ordinary sense as it is to eschew “truth” in the intuitionist sense 
(1980, 554). He would thus be contrasting “reasonable” with 
“true” rather than with “unreasonable.” That would be par for 
the course in a metatheoretical position, but there is neither a 
need nor any room in this context for such relentless pursuit of 
that distinction. Rawls invokes the qualification “reasonable” 
at every step of theory construction and theory justification, as 
well as in discussing corollaries, implications, and applications. 
Outside metatheoretical discussions, he should have no greater 
recourse to the reasonable than the intuitionist has to the true. 
I have yet to come across an example of an intuitionist work-
ing out descriptive or normative theories, or any applications 
thereof, by appealing to so many variables that are simply true. 
But I do see Rawls doing this with variables that are simply 
reasonable.
The emphasis on the reasonable may alternatively, or in 
addition, be read as a reflection of Rawls’s intellectual mod-
esty. After all, Rawls never claims that the considered moral 
judgments of competent moral judges are explicated only by 
the seven moral principles he lays out in his “Outline” (1951, 
192–193). He proposes only that such judgments are, in fact, ex-
plicated by those principles, leaving open the question whether 
they are or can be explicated by others as well. Actually, the 
question is not as open as it may seem, considering that suc-
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cessful consultation with the judges requires unanimous (or 
near-unanimous) agreement, which, in turn, leaves little to no 
room for multiple outcomes. Nevertheless, it must be granted 
that Rawls is emphatically tentative in his presentation of the 
original principles. He characterizes the set of principles as “a 
statement of what are hoped to be satisfactory principles of 
justice” and goes on to qualify that statement as “provision-
ary” (1951, 191).
This might have been a compelling objection had such 
intellectual modesty come with room for alternatives. It does 
not. Rawls leaves no such room in the “Outline,” where he 
works with the assumption “that a satisfactory and compre-
hensive explication of the considered judgments of competent 
judges is already known” (1951, 187). What is relevant here is 
not that the said judgments are already known, which I grant 
as an assumption, but that the explication is both satisfactory 
and comprehensive with respect to the considered moral judg-
ments of competent moral judges. This suggests that Rawls, 
despite his modesty, does not mean to leave open the ques-
tion regarding the tenability of competing moral platforms. 
If his seven moral principles (or any later reformulations in 
any combination) are satisfactory and comprehensive with 
respect to the considered moral judgments of competent moral 
judges, this leaves no room for a competing moral framework. 
A satisfactory and comprehensive explication of the very same 
data set (the considered moral judgments of competent moral 
judges) cannot be had through competing (mutually inconsis-
tent) perspectives.26 Any plurality would have to be limited to 
redundant systems (or redundant “reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines”). And this means that Rawls places far greater con-
fidence in his own principles (and far less in others) than his 
26 The emphasis on “comprehensive” here is not yet the technical sense 
established later (1985) to distinguish between a “political” conception and a 
conception derived from a “comprehensive” doctrine—a general distinction 
also instantiated as a specific contrast between “political” and “metaphysical” 
conceptions of justice (e.g., 1985, 1987, 1988). See, for example, the Restatement 
(2001) of justice as fairness, where Rawls acknowledges that the relevant 
distinction had not yet been brought to bear in Theory (nor therefore prior to 
it): “That work [Theory] never discusses whether justice as fairness is meant as 
a comprehensive moral doctrine or as a political conception of justice” (2001, 
186).
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identification of them as provisionary would seem to suggest.
Truth be told, I am comfortable with Rawls’s conception of 
justice, including all the principles explicating it. But this is a 
confession, not an argument. His principles of justice, in any 
formulation, have no inherent advantage over the principles 
of other “reasonable” systems, say, utilitarian or deontological 
ones, in terms of justificatory support from his own decision 
procedure for ethics. Yet his principles are so basic that they 
might even be their own justification. And if they are not them-
selves foundational, they might still pass for a derivative of the 
categorical imperative, perhaps even for a direct albeit complex 
restatement of it. In either case, no justification would seem 
to be required if by that is meant proof in the sense famously 
rejected by John Stuart Mill.27 And perhaps none is possible (as 
Mill insists).
That is why, when all is said and done, the ultimate jus-
tification Rawls leaves us with is that a liberal conception of 
justice is something of an acquired taste, or as he puts it, an 
“acquired allegiance” (e.g., 1987, 21–22), a habituation of sorts 
that gradually yet persistently makes its way into the sociocul-
tural fabric of political existence (1993, 158–168; 2001, 192–195). 
His account of the possibility of overlapping consensus as the 
foundation of political liberalism rests, in the end, on this ap-
peal to collective habituation—a part of the “reasonable moral 
psychology” (e.g., 1987, 22, 23) expected of everyone (i.e., of 
every citizen).
This is why I am satisfied with his principles but not with 
his justification of them, that is, neither with his justification in 
the “Outline” (which is what is at the forefront here) nor with 
his justification elsewhere (which is just as relevant). The rea-
son is not that I have been able to develop a better justification 
model myself or that I have adopted one already developed by 
someone else. I should not have to do either as a condition for 
rejecting what does not work. My failure is not Rawls’s suc-
cess.
There is no compelling indication that Rawls’s principles of 
justice are justified by his decision procedure in any sense or to 
27 This is Mill’s position on the nature of proof in questions of ultimate 
ends. He discusses it in Utilitarianism (1969, 207–208, 234): chapter one, 
paragraph five; chapter four, paragraph one.
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any degree that sets them apart from other actual or conceiv-
able positions on justice whose principles may perform just as 
well in the same decision procedure. As for the later appeal to 
what will naturally emerge through many generations as the 
most palatable conception of justice, this is entirely possible. 
But even there we do not have much more than Rawls’s con-
sidered opinion that the overlapping consensus will favor a 
liberal conception of justice, specifically the one formulated by 
Rawls, as opposed to a conservative alternative, or really any 
alternative whatsoever.
On the whole, Rawls is as open to alternatives as is hu-
manly possible, which does not rule out a certain degree of ri-
gidity in his political views. As he later acknowledges openly 
(The Law of Peoples), he is neither enthusiastic nor optimistic 
about dialogue with people who are not on board with politi-
cal liberalism:
Those who reject constitutional democracy with its criterion of 
reciprocity will of course reject the very idea of public reason. 
For them the political relation may be that of friend or foe, to 
those of a particular religious or secular community or those 
who are not; or it may be a relentless struggle to win the world 
for the whole truth. Political liberalism does not engage those 
who think this way. [1999, 132]
This seems to leave plenty of room for dogmatism, and not 
as much as promised for pluralism. An overlapping consensus 
will, of course, be liberal if alternatives are excluded in the 
first place. It is difficult to see how Rawls’s later works might 
readily absolve him of the application bias identified in this 
article.
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